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Abstract
This paper is motivated by the observation that (1) socio economic analysis
uses significantly less formalisms than mainstream economics, and (2) that
there exist numerous situations in which socio economics could benefit from
a more formal analysis. This is particularly the case if institutions play an
important role in the system to be investigated.
Starting with a broad conception of a formalism, this paper introduces and
discusses five different formal approaches regarding their adequateness for
socio economic analysis: The Social Fabric Matrix Approach, the Institutional
Analysis and Development Framework, System Dynamics, (Evolutionary)
Game Theory, and Agent Based Computational Modeling.
As a formal analysis always comes up with implicit ontological and epistemo-
logical tendencies, that have to be reflected if the formalism should contribute
to a better understanding of the system under investigation, this paper pays
particular attention to these tendencies of the considered formalisms.
In the end, antagonisms and possible convergences among the formalisms
are discussed.
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1 Introduction
”The tool kit is not as important as the perspective, but it is imperative
for giving the perspective meaning in any applied sense.”
Hayden (1982, p. 638)
Socio-economic analysis seeks to understand the relationship between the economy and
society. The role of social and economic institutions therefore plays a key role in any
socio-economic inquiry and there exists a natural overlap between the school of social
and institutional economics.
This is particularly true for the part of institutional termed original institutional
economics (OIE). The other part, the new institutional economics (NIE) considers
scarcity and competition at a central stage of analysis, markets are seen as a superior
way to allocate scarce resources in a society (Menard and Shirley, 2014, p. 557) and
shares the conviction that institutions must be explained with (at best boundedly)
rational individuals as the starting point. No effort is spent on the explanation of how
their preferences come about (Hodgson, 2004, p. 6). Despite this limited scope, new
institutionalists have produced much more theoretical work than socio economists or
original institutionalists.
This paper was motivated by the observation that while formal analysis plays a more
prominent role in NIE, it is used quite sparely in the overlapping work of OIE and socio
economics. Why is this the case and could a more extensive use of formalisms increase
the productivity of social economics as a discipline? Are social economists and original
institutionalists against formal arguments per se?
A closer inspection shows that this is not the case but that the rejection of many
common mainstream formalisms is based on very specific and reasonable arguments:
Socio economists critisize the orthodox optimization-cum-equilibrium approach for its
implicit value judgments and for the too strong and specific reduction of complexity
required to keep its models tractable.
Furthermore, given the dynamic nature of social systems, for socio economists dynamics
cannot be seen as an additional factor that potentially improves a static scrutiny (as it
is the case in most mainstream studies), but must be a constituent part of any form of
socio-economic analysis. Considering the society from a static perspective and neglecting
the cumulative change that has led to the current state of affairs would be meaningless
from this perspective. Thus, the prominent equilibrium models were not considered
to provide valuable insights as they can only seen as small snapshots within a greater
societal dynamic.
Also, Galbraith (1967), among others, convincingly argued that powerful economic
actors make their strategic choices not mainly as a reaction to their environment, but
mainly in order to change this environment. Galbraith uses the example of big business
corporations to illustrate this point. This form of different motiviations and a mutual
interdependency of choices and the agent’s environment is seldomly captured in a formal
analysis. Similarly, socio economic analysis requires the consideration of values, traditions,
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habits and the different motives governing the behavior of economic agents.1 To consider
these aspects adequately in a formalism similar to that of neoclassical economics is
impossible.
Having identified these socio economic arguments against a too formal analysis, we
will use them as a starting point for the search to formalisms very different to that of
neoclassical economics and from which socio economic analysis can indeed benefit greatly.
This paper discusses some formalisms that I consider to be candidates for socio
economic analysis. Each of them has particular advantages that can enhance socio
economic analysis in a particular sense, be it, e.g., an increase of the logical depth of
the argument (game theory, system dynamics), the possibility to study phenomena that
cannot be subject to verbal analysis (agent based models) or by structuring the overall
assessment (SFM and IAD). All of them have to be treated with some care as formalisms
always shape the analysis in a certain, often not obvious regard. This is why I will pay
particular attention to the implicit epistemological and ontological tendencies of the
formalisms.
At this point it seems to be adequate to define what I mean when using the term
”formalism”. In a very narrow sense, a formalism denotes any abstract language, such as
mathematical or logical formulas, or a computer language. We may call these formalisms
in the narrow sense. But to limit the term to systems of such expressions seems to be
too restrictive for our purpose: A table that is to be completed via verbal words and
then carries a specific message can also considered a formalism: Its strucutre carries
information and shapes the meaning of the words that have been used to complete it.
The social fabric matrix and the institutional analysis and development framework, which
will be discussed below, are examples of formalisms in this broader sense. A general
working definition of a formalism might be a set of abstract or specific objects that are
related to each other in a certain way and which can be specified further in the course of
analysis. Such a definition captures the central idea of a formalism: A pre-defined set of
variables and a pre-defined set of relations that are then be put together and specified by
the modeler who makes use of this formalism. As will become clear later on, this notion
of pre-specification is key: It carries meaning that has to be reflected on if the formalisms
is to be used successfully.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section I present four
formalisms that have already been used successfully in institutionalist theory and that I
consider to have particular potential for socio-economic analysis. In section 3 I propose
agent-based models as another useful formalism in this sense. As it is not yet well
established in current research praxis, I spend some more space on explaining its affinity
to social economics. Section 4, after introducing a useful taxonomy for the formalisms,
discusses their ontological and epistemological tendencies and elaborates on potential
complementarities and antagonisms among them. Section 5 concludes.
1Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) and Hodgson (2006) have convincingly argued the the effect of institutions
is not directly on human behavior or their preferences but on their habits (i.e. their propensity to
behave in particular ways in a particular class of situations, see Hodgson (2003, p. 163-164) for a
detailed exposition).
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2 Established Formal Approaches
2.1 The Social Fabric Matrix
The Social Fabric Matrix Approach (SFM-A) was developed by Hayden (1982) and
summarized recently in Hayden (2006a). Since its invention it has been used by institu-
tionalists many times and represents one formalism consistent with OIE methodology.
See Fullwiler et al. (2009) for a detailed assesment of this claim and a number of case
studies illustrating the substantial usefulness of the approach. As such it seems to be
a natural candidate to study institutions within a broader social economic analysis. A
SFM is a map that includes all the relevant components of the system under investigation
and represents the relations and flows between these components.
If written in matrix form, the rows and columns represent the different components
of the system that the researcher has identified. See figure 1a for an example. The
rows contain all the delivering components, the columns the receiving components and
the values in the cells denote either the existence or absence of a direct relation among
the components (if only boolean values are allowed) or the strength of the relationship
(if the value is some measure for the existent flow). Note, however, that the SFM is
a multidimensional tool, i.e. the relations and flows of the SFM are not necessarily
measured by the same unit - this distinguishes it from simple Input-Output matrices.
Thus the matrix gives an overview about all the relevant flows in the system under
investigation. But, for many researchers an even more important point, the process of
completing the matrix helps the researcher to ask new and relevant questions on the
subject matter and to discover components and relationships that would otherwise have
stayed unconsidered (Fullwiler et al., 2009, p. 12). The SFM can therefore be considered
a heuristic forcing the researcher to think about the whole system in which the concrete
problem is embedded into and to identify the relevant variables and relationships of this
system. Becasuse there are no precompleted SFM, the researcher has to build her matrix
anew from scratch, which forces her to justify her selection of relevant factors explicitly.
The flexibility of the matrix prevents unreflected reference to standards, something
common in too many formalism. To the contrary, the matrix stimulates researchers to
be explicit about their subjective valuations.
As the matrix can naturally be interpreted as the adjacency matrix of a graph, the
matrix shown in figure 1a could also be represented in graph form, see figure 1b. If the
matrix was completed using boolean values denoting the existence or the absence of a
relation between two components, the result would be a simple digraph, if the values in
the cells are a measure for the degree of relation, the resulting graph will be a weighted
digraph - although the different weights are not necessarily comparable.
The interpretation of the SFM as an adjacency matrix involves many advantages,
in particular one can use numerous useful graph theoretic concepts to get a deeper
understanding of the system under investigation: For the resulting graph, reachability
problems can be studied: In the logic of a graph, a reachability problem asks for the
existence of a path from node a to node b, in the context of the SFM this asks how
different components are indirectly interrelated, and, if the graph specification includes
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(a) An example for a SFM.
(b) The SFM represented as a directed
graph.
Figure 1: An example for an SFM (subset of the original matrix) and a corresponding
graph, based on Hoffman and Hayden (2007).
weights, how intense the interrelatedness is. One can also compute the degree distribution
or other measures of centrality in order to assess the relative influence of the different
components.
The SFM-A is probably the most widely used integrated framework within OIE. It has
been developed particular for institutionalist analysis and numerous scholars have used
it in their analysis.2 We are not aware of any application of the matrix outside OIE, set
aside the overlaps with social economics. Users stress that the matrix structures research,
suggests ever new interesting questions and demands the researcher to take a systemic
perspective on the system under investigation (Fullwiler et al., 2009). Furthermore, it
does not require any inappropriate reduction of complexity or abstraction from dynamics
and is flexible enough to consider many different aspects of the system, reaching from
environmental variables, over institutions and organizations to the value system and
persistent behavioral patterns. Especially if interpreted as a directed graph, it has helped
to generate spectacular and policy relevant results, e.g. by considering the contractual
structure associated with the construction of a nuclear dump side by the Central Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Compact in Nebraska, USA, in collaboration with several big
companies. Hayden and Bolduc (2000) were able to reveal the corresponding costs for
the public that are, due to the contractual structure and the resulting system of positive
feedback loops, much higher than one initially would have expected. As a consequence
of these results, the project was abandoned.
2For a corresponding compilation see Hayden (2006a), or consider Tool (2003) and Fullwiler et al.
(2009) for a summary of the impact the SFM-A had on public policy.
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Figure 2: An illustration of the IAD, after by Ostrom (2005, p. 15).
2.2 Institutional Analysis and Development Framework
The IAD is a general framework for the study of institutions and their development
over time. It was developed mainly by Ostrom (1990) and is compatible with several
different theories. For Ostrom, frameworks are meant to illustrate the elements and
relationship required for the analysis at a most general level and thus to structure the
following inquiry (Ostrom, 2011, p. 8). One framework can be compatible with many
different theories that can be compared using the metatheoretical language provided by
the framework. Different theories focus on different elements suggested by the framework
and help to develop different working assumptions for the particular problem at hand.
The neoclassical approach to economics could be interpreted as a theory in this sense,
similarly the OIE research program.
The IAD is structured as illustrated in figure 2.
At center stage of the framework is the action situation. This is the arena in which
the actors (inter)act and from which the dynamics of the system are triggered. The
identification of the action situation is one of the first steps the researcher has to take
after the problem at hand is defined. As illustrated in figure 2, the action situation is
embedded into a broader analysis:
The environmental conditions, the attributes3 of the community and its rules all have
significant influence on the action and interaction of the individuals. And there are of
course cases in which the outcomes from the action situation influence the environmental
conditions which then in turn act upon the action situation - such feedback loops can be
identified and clarified using the IAD.
In the very simplest case, however, one assumes the external variables to be constant
and focus one’s analysis on the action situation alone. Figure 3 illustrates how the
analysis of the action situation proceeds.
Usually one develops a particular model to study the action situation in more detail.
3Attributes of a community include, but are not limited to, the level of trust and reciprocity, habits,
the value structure or cultural dispositions.
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positions at particular nodes may, must, or must not take. Scope rules delimit the
potential outcomes that can be affected and, working backward, the actions linked to
specific outcomes. Choice rules, combined with the scientific laws about the relevant
states of the world being acted upon, determine the shape of the decision tree that
links actions to outcomes. Aggregation rules affect the level of control that a partici-
pant in a position exercises in the selection of an action at a node. Information rules
affect the knowledge-contingent information sets of participants. Payoff rules affect
the benefits and costs that will be assigned to particular combinations of actions and
outcomes, and they establish the incentives and deterrents for action. The set of
working rules is a configuration in the sense that the effect of a change in one rule
may depend upon the other rules-in-use.
Let us return to the example of conducting an analysis of common-pool
resources (see Gibson, McKean, & Ostrom, 2000). Now I will focus on a series of
questions that are intended to help the analyst get at the rules-in-use that help
structure an action situation. Thus, to understand these rules, one would begin to ask
questions such as:
• Boundary rules: Are the appropriators from this resource limited to local resi-
dents; to one group defined by ethnicity, race, caste, gender, or family structure;
to those who win a lottery; to those who have obtained a permit; to those who
own required assets (such as a fishing berth or land); or in some other way
limited to a class of individuals that is bounded? Is a new participant allowed to
join a group by some kind of entry fee or initiation? Must an appropriator give
up rights to harvest upon migrating to another location?
Information
Rules
Aggregation
Rules
Scope
Rules
Payoff
Rules
Position
Rules
Choice
Rules
Boundary
Rules ACTORS
assigned to
POSITIONS
assigned to
ACTIONS
INFORMATION
about
CONTROL
over
Linked to
NET COSTS
AND BENEFITS
assigned to
POTENTIAL
OUTCOMES
Figure 3. Rules as Exogenous Variables Directly Affecting the Elements of an Action Situation.
Source: Adapted from E. Ostrom (2005, p. 189).
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Figure 3: A closer illustration of the action situation, taken from Ostrom (2011, p. 20).
For Ostrom, several models can be derived fro the same theory, and different theories
are com a ible with th IAD. It is therefore entirely possible to model the action situation
using pur ly neoclassical models, game th oretic models or any other kind of model (e.g.
agent based models, see section 3).
If one treats the variables marked as ”external” in figure 2 as exogenous variables, one is
concerned only with a model including the seven aspects illustrated in figure 3: The set of
actors containing all individuals involved, the set of positions the individuals can occupy
(e.g. managers, employees, members of an association, etc.), the set of actions that the
individuals can take, the description of the control individuals have on their choices (i.e.
are decisions made in isolation, or do individuals act on the behalf of others?) and the
information available to he individuals, the set of potential outc mes of the aggregated
individual actions and a descriptio of how these outc mes represent costs or benefits to
the individuals. All the relevant information has to be gathered before the actual modeling
process can begin. Then one makes assumptions about the behavior of the individuals,
their wishes, beliefs, their capacities, and so on. Although the most widely used approach
would be to se the conventional ne classical utility maximizer as a starting point, this
is by no mea required by the IAD. To the contr ry, the questions suggest d by the
IAD point o a more realistic and socially embedd d actor. The experiments of Ostrom
et al. (1992) on the mechanisms underlying sustainable self-organization of common
goods within communities were motivated by the observation that the conventional game
theoretic individual was not an adequate candidate for the individuals in the action
arena if one tries to understand how communities manage their common goods without
running into the problems of the ”Tragedy of the Commons”. During her analysis, she
refined her model of individuals within the broader IAD framework.
Also, in many situations, it does not seem to be adequate to consider the action
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situation in isolation and to assume the external variables to be exogeneous. For a
systemic scrutiny of the problem at hand, as it is required in institutionalist pattern
models (Wilber and Harrison, 1978; Gra¨bner, 2014), one considers the external variables
as endogeneous variables treated explicitly in the model. Ostrom (2011) suggests a
taxonomy according to which one can incorporate the rules of the commmunity under
investigation into the action situation, as illustrated in figure 3. Such a refinement is
entirely possible in and suggested by the IAD which could in general be interpreted as a
sophisticated topoi guiding the researcher’s thinking, rather than a full-fledged modeling
tool.
Another crucial part of the IAD that is of particular relevance for socio-economic
scholars is the very right part of figure 2: The evaluation of the dynamics resulting
from the action arena. The evaluation criteria must be specified by the researcher in
advance and depending on her theoretical orientation they can include only aggregate
and monetary measures, or can be multidimensional, as required for an social economic
analysis.
Summarizing the above said: The IAD framework is an extremely general framework
that is compatible with many different theoretical directions. It has gained an enormous
popularity among scientists and practitioners and is now used in various scientific
communities, see Ostrom (2005) or Hodgson (2013b) for compilations of work consistent
with the socio economic framework. These examples show that the value position of the
researchers can be made very explicit due to the prominent role attached to evaluative
criteria and that cultural habits, beliefs etc. can be included into the analysis of the
action situation, allowing a truly systemic perspective on the problem at hand. It is to
be noted, though, that the perspective of the IAD is much more focused on individual
action than is the SFM-A: The action situation is at the center stage, and the overall
dynamics are derived from the this arena, even if a continuous feedback between action
situation, resulting outcomes and the subsystems of the entire system is possible. This
issue will be discussed in more detail in section 4.
2.3 System Dynamics
System dynamics was originally developed by Forrester (1971) and introduced into
institutionalist economics by Radzicki (1988) who considered institutionalist pattern
modeling, as is was outlined by Wilber and Harrison (1978), to lack structure, rigor and
precision. He hoped to address these shortcomings through the introduction of system
dynamics, i.e. the computerization of the original pattern models (Radzicki, 1988, p.
636). For him, the computational modeling technique of system dynamics represents
a computational approach not only broadly consistent with traditional institutionalist
pattern modeling. He even goes so far to state that ”the only real difference between
the two [system dynamics and institutionalist pattern modeling] is that the building
of formal computer models is generally not a part of institutional analysis” (Radzicki,
1988, p. 634) and calls system dynamics and institutionalism two ”parallel universes”
(Radzicki, 1988, p. 639). Given the aforementioned overlap between institutional and
social economics, it is also a natural candidate formalism for social economists.
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Desired water volume
Tap angle
Water flow Water volume
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Figure 4: A simple causal loop diagram for a system dynamics model of a bathtub filling
situation due to Lane (2008). This diagram assumes that if the water volume
rises, one increasingly closes the tap in order to avoid flooding. Note that this
is just a simplified illustration of the model and that the strength and direction
of the relationships can vary, depending of the overall state of the model.
A system dynamics model is a set of differential equations that is solved numerically.
Its vantage point is the claim that individuals in a given system follow goal seeking
behavior (Radzicki, 1988, p. 640) and that the structure of a system, into which these
individuals are embedded into, is an important driving force of its dynamics (Radzicki,
2009, p. 70). The structure of the system involves its physical structure, organizational
structure and the psychological decision making structure. Such an analysis is to be
considered a systemic approach as the goal seeking behavior of the individuals both
affects and is influenced by the structure of the system.
The first step when building a system dynamics model is to identify the important
variables (or ”stocks”) of the system under consideration and the dependency structure
among the variables (the ”flows”). When considering the stocks, one must also pay
attention to limiting factors, as most stocks face some natural constraint: The number
of workers is bounded by the overall population and the area of land is constraint by the
size of the region. The stocks of a system are related to each other via the flows, and the
combination of these relations leads to the notion of feedback loops.
In the model building phase or if the model is presented to an audience, one can
make use of causal loop diagramming in order to illustrate the feedback loops and causal
relationship within the model: Stocks, flows and auxiliary variables are drawn as nodes
of a directed graph and the edges between two nodes represent a causal relationship
between the stock and flow. The edges are labeled with either a ′+′ or a ′−′ depending
of whether the relationship is positive of negative. See figure 4 as a simple example.
These loops are then expressed in differential equations that specify the relationships
more precisely. Thus the system as a whole becomes a system of (usually highly non-
linear) equations that is solved via numerical simulation. The most general formulation
of a system dynamics model, given X = {X1, X2, ..., Xn} as a vector of the stocks, and
p as a vector containing all constants and the initial conditions, is therefore:
dXi
dt
= fi(X, p), i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. (1)
9
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power from thermal fuels) are omitted. A number of economic structures that
contribute to disequilibrium are omitted, such as sectoral labor pools and cash
reserves. Inventories and backlogs are omitted, as they equilibrate quickly
relative to the model horizon. In a way the model can be regarded as a hybrid
between disequilibrium system dynamics energy models (Sterman 1981) and
economic equilibrium optimization models; this difficult marriage facilitates
comparison of the two approaches through parameter changes.
The model can be divided into nine subsystems that have relatively sparse
interactions. Figure 1 illustrates the sector boundaries, internal activities, and
external relationships.
The fundamental behavior of themodel can be summarized by a few feedback
loops (Figure 2). The reinforcing process of capital accumulation drives
economic growth (augmented by exogenous population and factor productivity
growth). Climate change acts like a weak balancing loop that restrains growth.
Economic activity requires energy input; which leads to carbon emissions.
Emissions increase the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere, causing
temperature to rise. As the global temperature rises, climate change damages
reduce economic output and diverts it from other purposes, reducing growth.
The energy and economy sectors interact through the exchange of goods
for energy. Within the energy sector, learning and depletion drive energy
production costs. Taxes and permits raise carbon energy prices in response to
increasing CO2 emissions and atmospheric concentrations.
(a) The different sectors of the model.
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Fig. 2. Major feedback
processes
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The principal yardstick by which welfare implications of policies are
measured is the concept of cumulative discounted utility (Eq. 1), in which
the utility of an infinitely-lived representative individual is weighted by the
population and a discount factor for time preference:
CDU D
∫
e◃!"t▹L◃t▹U◃t▹dt ◃1▹
where CDU D cumulative discounted utility, L D population, " D rate of time
preference, and U D utility of representative individual. With the rate of time
preference " D 0, the welfare of all generations is weighted equally. Any " > 0
represents a preference for current welfare—pure myopia. With " D 0.03, the
weight to future welfare declines by half in only 23 years, and climate damages
in 2100 are only 5 percent as important as present costs of emissions reductions.
In the simulations presented here, intangible or non-market environmental
services are neglected, so an individual’s utility is purely a function of
consumption, given by Eq. 2:
U D ◃c/c0▹
◃1!$▹ ! 1
1! $ ◃2▹
(b) The causal loop diagram nderly-
ing the model.
Figure 5: These diagrams taken from Fiddaman (2002) to ill strate the struc tre of
Fiddaman’s model.
There a e no equ librium assumptions or the like because an unambiguous analytic
solution is not attempted for. Because of the use of differential equations the system is
inherently dynamic and th strength of the feedback loops can vary during the evolution
of the model.
The translation of the theoretical model into equations and computer code ensures full
transparency and maximum rigor in the model formulation. Note that the researcher
continuously improves her knowledge about the system through the modeling process
itself, as the obligation to state all relationships explicitly and precisely leads to ever new
questions about the system under investigation. Similar to what has been said about the
SFM-A, many authors (including the inventor of system dynamics J. Forrester) claim
that the building of a system dynamics model and the corresponding learning process is
even more valuable than the final model itself (Forrester, 1985; Radzicki, 2009).
Let me provide a quick example that illustrates the general structure of a system
dynamics model. While the model description is by no means complete and the interested
reader should refer to the original publication, it still gives an idea about the structure
of typical system dynamics models. Fiddaman (2002) studies the potential effects of
climate policy on the socio economic system and derives some policy advice about how
CO2 emissions can be reduced most efficiently. The structure of the model is illustrated
in figure 5 and it becomes immediately clear that the model represents a holistic view on
the system under investigation. Furthermore, the author includes boundedly rational
agents and is able to study the dynamics of the socio-economic systems without any
concept of equilibrium.4
Although the approach came under heavy critique by Hayden (2006b), who considered it
to make too strong assumptions regarding the closedness of the system under investigation
and to focus on (static) feedback loops, rather than on real dynamics caused by the
4Note that Fiddaman (2002) has not considered any cultural habits of values explicitly in his model.
But these could be added into the model without great difficulty.
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relations between the system itself, there are numerous examples of successful applications
of the concept. Radzicki and Tauheed (2009) provides a long list of best practice
examples for socio economic analysis making use of system dynamics modeling that
include Fiddaman (2002), Hayden and Bolduc (2000) and Bassi (2008).
2.4 Institutional Dynamics and Evolutionary Game Theory
Game theory has a long tradition in many different disciplines of science. It was
introduced into economics by the mathematician John von Neumann and the economist
Oskar Morgenstein in 1944 . Since then, its importance, also, but not only, in neoclassical
mainstream economics, has been growing dramatically.
While original game theory is mostly in the tradition of the rational choice paradigm,
biologists developed a derivation called evolutionary game theory, that does not rely on
the classical rationality axioms. It analyses how different strategies perform in different
environments, under which circumstances they replicate and how they evolve over time.
5
There were also several attempts to reconcile institutionalism with (especially evolu-
tionary) game theory, e.g. Field (1994), and more recently Hedoin (2010), Pelligra (2011)
and Vilena and Vilena (2004).
Here I will use the example of Paul D. Bush’s Theory of Institutional Change and
its refinement in a game theoretic framework by Elsner (2012) to illustrate how socio
economists can and have made use of game theory to gain additional insights into
the emergence and evolution of important institutions. In his ”Theory of Institutional
Change” Bush (1987) established a coherent theoretical device to analyse the value
basis for behavioural patterns and the resulting dynamics in the form of progressive
and regressive institutional change. Starting from the conception of an institution
as patterns of behaviours correlated by socially prescribed values, he builds on the
dichotomy of instrumental and ceremonial value systems and develops the distinction
between ceremonially and instrumentally warranted patterns (Bush, 1987, p. 1082).
Using the idea of ceremonial dominance, he argues convincingly how new technologies
introducing new opportunities for instrumental behaviour generally do not lead to
institutional progress as the new instrumental behavioural options get encapsulated
through ceremonial values with more ceremonial or dialectical behavioural patterns.
Progressive institutional progress is possible only if the ceremonial dominance in the
society gets reduced by substituting ceremonial values with instrumental ones.
Enlightening as it is, the theory does not explain how ceremonial dominance emerges
endogeneously in a given society, which could, in principle, also be instrumentally
dominated.
25 years later, Elsner (2012) took up the Theory of Institutional Change and addresses
this shortcomings using an evolutionary-institutional interpretation of game theory in
5Strategies are often interpreted as genes, but also as values, behavior, habits or the like. There
exist settings in which the strategies themselves are under ongoing change and players develop new
strategies, according to the rules of Darwinian evolution, see e.g. Lindgren (1992).
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the Axelrodian framework of the evolution of cooperation. Elsner elaborates further
complementaries and equivalences between the two approaches and stresses the similar
policy prescriptions derived from the two perspectives (Elsner and Heinrich, 2011, p. 38).
He argues that although game theory cannot provide an epistmological bases com-
parable to that of institutionalism, it can, if embedded into a broader institutionalist
process story, add rigor and logical depth into the institutionalist analysis, allows for a
clearer distinction between different types of social rules and institutions, and enhance
the institutionalist analysis, e.g. by offering an explanation for the initial emergence of
ceremonial dominance in the context of Bush’s theory.
Today, many heterodox economics, including social economists, still struggle with
the application of game theory, firstly as it also plays an important role in mainstream
economics, secondly because of the value sensitivity of game theoretic models that are, at
least in their classical interpretation, rooted in an individualistic perception of the human
individual. But while even classical game theory can be interpreted in an evolutionary-
institutional setting (as the example above as illustrated), it is especially evolutionary
game theory that might be of particular value for institutionalists: EGT does not rely
on the strict assumptions about individual preference structures as classical game theory
does, and it centers around the question of how strategies (which can be interpreted in a
very broad sense, see above) evolve in a population. 6
And if the application of game theory is not considered a value in itself and the
institutionalist authors manage to provide adequate process stories into which they
embed their game theoretic analysis, the game theoretical part, in the end, takes the
form of a heuristic adding analytic clarity to the well-known institutionalist concepts.
By doing so it enlarges their reach to more complex problem structures, which could not
have been understood without the support of such a clarifying heuristic.
3 Agent-Based-Computational Models
3.1 Introduction and Affinity to Social Economics
Agent based models (ABMs) are a relatively new trend in the social sciences, although
they are already well established in many other research disciplines such as urban planning,
ecology, demographics, epidemiology or logistics.7
The basic idea of ABM is to specify the fundamental entities of a system as autonomous
agents that are able to interact with each other and their environment. After the agents
and their environment are designed in a reasonable manner one studies the systemic
and dynamic consequences that result from this configuration, and conducts artificial
experiments by altering specific aspects and comparing the resulting dynamics. Although
6Refined models allow the populations to be dynamic and growing, or having a certain interaction
structure. The opportunities are manifold.
7ABMs are used in the social sciences since the 1990s, with Epstein and Axtell (1996) and their
”Generative Social Science” as a major vantage point. But there were some predecessors in the 60s,
particularly in the field of cellular automata theory.
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the agents usually represent individuals, this is not necessarily the case: depending on the
system under investigation, the agents can represent households, groups, organizations
or states.
The interaction among the agents can be entirely random or can be due to the
topological structure of the model: Agents can be allocated on a (possibly changing)
graph that represents an empirical interaction structure, on a grid on which the agents
can make moves, or any other topological structure. This allows to model the agents as
socially embedded and interdependent individuals.
Even more important, ABMs allows to model decentralized decision making: There is
not necessarily an artificial central planning institution such for example the Walrasian
Auctioneer in most general equilibrium models. Rather, the dynamics of the system
modeled are the result of the autonomous interactions of the different agents and illustrate
the self-organization a given system is capable of.
The agents themselves are usually programmed in a computer language, which allows
for a very flexible specification: they are given one or several attributes, such as income,
saving, health, or a certain disposition, functions according to which these attributes
change and behavioral functions that determine their actions. All these functions can
have diverse inputs: The current state of the agent, but also current state of other
agents or of the system as a whole. This means that, maybe contrary to what the
name suggests, ABMs are not necessarily individualistic models: The behavior of the
agents can depend on entities on different ontological levels: An agent can make different
decisions depending on the state of the whole system, or dependent of the state of a
certain group of agents. Thus, ABMs allow the natural consideration of institutions,
rules and networks on the meso level of the system and their corresponding downward
effects on the individual agents (Elsner and Heinrich, 2009; Elsner et al., 2014). It is
thus straightforward to study socio-economic phenomena that involve reconstitutive
downward causation, i.e. the ongoing mutual interralation between micro, meso and
macro level (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004). Also, the agents do not necessarily follow the
same stimulus-response pattern the whole time, but can be given the ability to adapt
themselves to their environment, learn from past experience and develop new objectives
and strategies.
The above said immediately leads to the question of whether one could design an
ABM with highly sophisticated artificial intelligence agents that resemble the behavior
of humans and thus guarantees a maximum level of realism. That there is no unanimous
answer to this question indicates the enormous heterogeneity of different perspectives
in the ABM community: Advocates of the so called KISS (’keep it simple, stupid!’)
paradigm argue that ABMs in general should be kept as simple as possible and one should
focus on the rules that are of essential importance for the research question, otherwise the
models would itself become to difficult to understand and it gets impossible to identify the
critical mechanisms that yield to the overall dynamics. Proponents of the KIDS (’keep it
descriptive, stupid!’) paradigm criticize the tendency to reductionism inherent to the
KISS approach and argue that agents should be built in line with empirical results from
psychology, anthopology and other empirical sciences concerned with human decision
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making. 8 ABMs are compatible with both world views and most models take their place
in between the two ideal cases.9 For socio-economists it is important that ABMs allow
a certain degree of realism that makes them compatible with different epistemological
perspectives, including the realist approach most widely accepted in social economics.
The heterogeneity of existent ABMs has already been mentioned. They represent
entirely different economic perspectives with very different underlying epistemologies and
ontologies: Some ABM are considered macro models that want to model an economy as
a whole, others model only one particular market or one particular region. Some of the
models try to be as realistic as possible, others remain very abstracts and illustrate the
effects of some mechanisms in isolation. Some ABMs are built for predictive purposes
only, whether others serve only explanatory reasons. There are ABMs that are built for
one particular system, e.g. the model of Geanakoplos et al. (2012) for the housing market
in Washington D.C., others are built as generic models, that try to illustrate more general
properties of systems, e.g. properties that are shared by any housing market in the USA.
Also, the mechanisms included into the models are very diverse: Many ABMs were build
to study the role of interrelations between agents such as different underlying network
structures, others focus on the effects of particular decision heuristics. All this also leads
to very different epistemologies and ontologies present in the ABM communities.10 It is
clear that only a small subset of all these ABMs are of interest for social economists, but
in the future they will (hopefully) increasingly build adequate ABMs themselves.
This seems to be proper as ABM can effectively address certain difficulties that social
economists face at the moment:
If one considers the economy from a systemic point of view, one has to take the
interaction among different ontological levels seriously. This involves the consideration of
both aggregation problems and the scrutiny of downward effects. Especially aggregation
mechanisms often lead counter-intuitive results or are difficult to be expressed verbally.
Take as an example the role of social networks and self-organization for the functioning
of exchange systems: Albin and Foley (1992) have shown that if one accepts the usual
axioms of the Arrow-Debreu economy but removes the fictitious Walrasian auctioneer
in favor of direct interaction among the agents, the market will develop towards an
equilibrium, but inequality among the agents increases. Also, the way the interaction
among the agents is structured, i.e. whether their interaction structure is modeled as
a ring, a star or another type of network, influences the dynamics. Today, there is a
huge amount of empirical evidence about how interaction networks in particular settings
look like. These networks can be described with numerous statistical measures, e.g.
8If one considers the economic agents to represent the micro level, ACE models are suited for microcal-
ibration. This involves a direct test of the adequateness of the agent design. It is common to consult
field experts to judge the behavioural assumptions or to exchange the agent with a real human being
”playing” the role of the agent in the model and then by comparing how the software and the real
human being have behaved. Because the behavioral specification of the agents is done via computer
code, there is no upper limit for the complexity of the rules other than accountability considerations.
Chen (2012) describes various types of agents including very elaborated artificial intelligence agents.
9Chen (2012) describes various types of agents including very elaborated artificial intelligence agents.
10Unfortunately, most model applications do not reflect explicitly on their epistemological orientation,
which makes it difficult to assess the models from a critical perspective.
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their degree distribution, their centrality, their clustering coefficient or their density,
among others. These statistics can make a huge difference in practice, yet they are very
difficult to be described with verbal language. ABMs can help to build a theory of how
different network structures affect certain exchange regimes and allow the use of the
extensive information we have about real world networks and how their shade affects the
aggregation of the individual actions within them.
Furthermore, ABM help to study the causal effects of different decision procedures
such as habit or inertia: As the decision making algorithms can be changed during
artificial experiments with the model, we can elaborate how different cognitive procedures
affect the system under consideration. Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) have build an ABM
that studies the emergence and evolution of a traffic convention. The decision making
procedure of their agents involves habituation and they show that habit and habituation
can help people to coordinate on a certain traffic convention. They are also able to show
that the effect of habit is particularly important and that it has a bigger effect than pure
inertia. Such reasoning would have been impossible without the heuristic use of their
ABM because verbal language does not provide the exactness necessary and does not
allow for artificial experiments to reveal the causal relationships. And it is of certain
importance for social economists who accentuate the importance to treat human agency
in a realistic and adequate manner.
3.2 Empirical Work and Relation to Econometric
Another huge potential of ABM for socio economists lies in their potential combination
with econometrics. Econometric studies abound in social economics, especially because
socio economists claim to work on a sound empirical basis and to orient their theory
strongly on reality.
But econometric models require quite strict assumptions about the relationship of the
variables in the system under consideration and the formalization of the hypothesis to be
tested by the researcher. Not only are these assumptions sometimes not met, if they are
not, the fault often remains unconsidered for a long time, because more sophisticated
estimation techniques that allow the identification of the problem had not yet been
developed. In the (still unresolved) debate about the empirical validity of the Kuznets
curve there have have been periods in which certain estimation techniques or data sets
were used by the majority of the researchers, resulting in general support for the thesis,
until later the same techniques and data sets were shown to be inadequate, new methods
were applied and the support turned into rejection (Alvarez-Pereira et al., 2014).
Furthermore, econometrics are generally inappropriate to consider aggregation mech-
anisms: Most of the studies use either exclusively aggregated macro variables (in a
macroeconometric framework) or micro variables (in a microeconometric framework),
without considering the important interplay between both (Chen, 2012). The systemic
analysis attempted by socio economists requires a systemic perspective that considers
the mechanisms between micro and macro levels, i.e. aggregation and downward effects,
explicitly. Aggregation represents a particular challenge to econometrics if the system
under investigation involves heterogeneous agents (i.e. almost always). Gatti et al.
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(2007) shows how many standard econometric concepts, including Granger causality,
impulse-response functions of structural VARs and cointegration) loose their explanatory
power and spurious results emerge as a consequence.
ABM can be helpful to address these shortcomings:
Considering the problem of inadequate estimation techniques as in the case of the
Kuznets curve, much confusion stemps from the fact that many econometric studies are
theoretically ad hoc. The underlying models often consider only a single ontological
level or are based on static rather than dynamic models. It is therefore often not clear
what time horizon has to be considered and which kind of data is adequate for the
empirical assessment. We have shown in Alvarez-Pereira et al. (2014) how ABMs can
provide the missing theory to diminish these problems: Adequately specified they make
clear statement about the time horizon to be considered and they help to condense the
aggregation effects in the data. In this regard, Chen (2012) suggests to use ABM as a
data generating mechanisms in order to assess the consistency of the econometric tests: If
estimations both for individual parameters and the aggregated data are both consistent,
the model has been adequately specified. Without the help of an ABM this consistency
remains simply assumed and adverse results emerge.
Lastly, ABM can also help to scrutinize the empirical validity of theories on different
levels: As has been argued above, ABMs are subject to micro- or meso-calibration. If a
theory gets formalized through an ABM, the resulting model can be tested against the
data not only through its overall result, but through the different mechanisms within the
model. This facilitates both the construction and the assessment of explanatory theories.
4 Classification and Discussion
In the preceeding sections I have presented formalisms that were (or should) seriously
considered by the socio-economic community. I will now compare them regarding their
potential fields of application and their ontological and epitemological tendencies. An
overview is given in table 1.
4.1 Frameworks, Theories, and Models
During this discussion I build upon Ostrom (2011) and her distinction between frameworks,
theories and models: A framework represent a general set of variables and certain general
relationships among these. It also provides a metatheoretical language with which one
can talk about these variables and relations. This language also helps to distinguish and
discuss different theories which put their focus on different parts of the framework and
suggest more specific assumptions that help to analyse the variables, their relations and
the system as a whole more precisely. One framework can therefore be compatible with
different theories, which then accentuate different parts of the framework and suggests
different interpretations. Models then involve very specific assumptions about some of
the elements of a theory and are used to derive precise predictions or explanations for
these variables. Different models can derived from the same theory and implemented
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within the same framework. 11 In our context, some preliminary questions immediately
arise: Which of the above described formalisms falls into which category, and how does
this relate to the relationship among the different formalisms?
The answer is obvious for the IAD: It is the canonical example of a framework. The
variables and relationships within the IAD can be further specified using different models,
and depending on the choice of the models, the overall study gets a more socio-economic,
neoclassical or different flavor. The IAD is not bound to a specific theory: There are
examples of very orthodox applications of the IAD with very strong assumptions regarding
the individuals in the interaction arena and the external variables as purely exogeneous.
But there are also examples of studies using the IAD within a systemic analysis of the
problem at hand, considering important external variables to be endogenous and to use
more realistic models for the action arena. Still, the IAD suggests by its design a certain
epistemology and ontology, as discussed below.
The SFM is usually used as a framework: As already mentioned, it helps to structure
the ideas of the researchers and to express the different variables and relationships
of the system under investigation. The specific relations can then be further studied
using different, more specific models. Radzicki (2009) shows this for the case of system
dynamics: The SFM provides a general overview, and the relationships are then expressed
via differential equations, giving rise to a system dynamic model. But an SFM could
also, in theory, be used as a model: If the variables are defined in a very narrow sense,
and the matrix represents a very definitive and closed system, the SFM could also be
used as a concrete model. But such cases are rather an exception than a rule.
For the other three formalisms, the answer is straightforward: ABM, SD, and GT
all represent concrete models. All of them require the researcher to make very clear
assumptions and to focus on certain relationships suggested by a more general theory.
ABMs for example are compatible with different theories and represent a very flexible
modeling tool that can be used to model various situations from very different perspectives.
But the single ABM is nevertheless a very concrete model with specific assumptions and
a concrete aim.
4.2 Ontological and Epistemological Tendencies
For the ontological and epistemological tendencies I distinguish three ideal cases: systemic,
individualist or holist tendencies. The technical design of all the formalism suggests a
certain approach. If this tendency is not adequately relflected, it will stay unrecognized,
with significant consequences for the outcome and the interpretation of the study.
I speak of an individualist tendency if the model or framework focuses on individual
agency to explain the phenomena present at various levels of the system under investiga-
tion. The distinction between an ontological and an epistemological individualism is the
following: While the individualist ontology suggest the absence of anything such as a
11For Ostrom, examples for theories are game theory, public choice theory, transaction cost theory and
the like. I define theory in a broder sense such as the neoclassical or institutionalist theory, but this
is not of crucial importance. I agree that the theory suggests the parts of the framework that are
given particular importance.
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”social whole”, the individualist epistemology does not deny such a social whole, but it
denies the possibility to learn anything about a system by considering this ”social whole”
directly. The system and the ”social whole” can be fully understood if one considers the
individuals making up the system. All relevant information on the system can be gained
by the exclusive study of the individual level. von Mises (1949) advocates an individualist
ontology when he argues that ”a social collective has no existence and reality outside the
individual members’ actions.”
A form of epistemological individualism is a articulated by John Hicks when he praised
Leon Walras for having understood ”that the only economic explanation of a phenomenon
is its reference back to individual acts of choice (Hicks, 1934, p. 348).12
A holistic tendency means that a model focuses on the relationship among macro
variables, as the societal whole is assumened to transcendent its individual members.
What happens in the system is the consequence of emergent properties of the system that
cannot be explained from the individual level. Again, an epistemological holist would
not question the ability of individuals to make conscious decisions and to influence their
environment, but individual actions are determined by macro variables alone. Studying
the latter already tells one everything about the former. An ontological holist would
go further and deny the existence of individual agency at all. A common example of
ontological holism is Marx’ statement according to which the ”capitalist functions only
as personified capital [...] just as the worker is no more than labour personified.” (Marx,
1982, p. 989).”
Systemism can be considered to be the ”golden middle” between individualism and
holism: Here the whole system is considered to be a composition of different sub-systems
that posses both reducible and non-reducible properties. Individual behavior both shapes
and is influenced by its environment: Both downward and upward effects play a role. For
the ontological systemist, there are different ontological levels within the system under
investigation and all of them contain relevant mechanisms and properties. Such a layered
ontology is an essential part the Darwinian interpretation of institutionalism elaborated
by Hodgson and Knudsen (2010). Similarly, according to systemist epistemology one
has to study all levels of a system and the corresponding relationships in order to fully
understand the system, both as a whole, and in its different parts. Such a view has been
put forward e.g. by Bunge (2004).
Game Theory Regarding the underlying ontology, game theory is the most rigid
formalism: It is certainly rooted in individualist thinking. Still, game theoretic models
can be useful for a systemic analysis if they are interpreted adequately. But such an
interpretation requires certain effort, as Elsner (2012) has argued extensively. There is a
clear epistemological tendency towards individualism as the only endogeneous driving
force in the model is the individual and a compatibility with a systemic epistemology
12Hodgson (2013a) rightly points to the confusion that is often associated with individualism when he
discusses the meaning of methodological individualism. Whether individualism includes the relation
among individuals has never been clarified. I think that the constituent element of individualism
in any sense is the denial of downward effects on individuals. This is in line with Kapeller (2015
(forthcomming) who identifies this denial with a simple fallacy of aggregation.
19
can be achieved only, if downward effects are included via the rules of the game. GT is
certainly not compatible with either holistic epistemology or ontology.
System Dynamics At the other end of the spectrum we have system dynamics models:
Although certain individualistic variables can be included into the models, they mostly
work with aggregated variables and the interaction among the agents on the micro levels
is not modeled explicitly. So while SD can be made compatible with a systemic ontology
or epistemology, such a specification is not directly suggested by its technical design. In
any case, SD is incompatible with both individualistic ontology and epistemology.
Agent Based Models ABMs are somehow in the middle, with a certain tendency
towards individualism: Agents are considered to be actors and one of the driving forces
for the dynamics in the system. Nevertheless their behavior and state can depend on the
state of entities on a higher ontological level, e.g. groups or the whole population. As
was shown above, systemic concepts such as reconstitutive downward causation can be
considered in a straightforward manner in ABM. Still, there is some tendency towards
individualism as the systemic processes must be actively included into the models, while
the upward effects from the micro to the macro level are naturally present in any ABM,
just due to its technical design.
A danger of ABM is thus that one tune the behavioral rules of the individuals such
that the desired macro behavior gets deduced from the individual actions alone - such
a specification is not necessarily realistic, especially if there is clear evidence for other
ontological levels playing a role. Such a failure can be prevented if all the decision
making procedures and other mechanisms in the models are made subject of empirical
assessment.
Social Fabric Matrix The SFM-A has a holist tendency, as individual decision making
is usually not directly included into the matrices. The focus is mostly on aggregated
variables and some influential institutions. Thus, the existence of different ontological
levels is acknowledged and frequently considered. But the behavior of different individuals
or emergent phenomena triggered by the interaction of heterogeneous individuals are
usually not modeled explicitly. It seems therefore fair to say that the SFM-A has a
holist tendency, at least concerning its epistemology. But it can very successfully be used
for a systemic investigation as well, especially if it gets enriched by ABMs to consider
aggregation problems and the role of individual agency explicitly.
IAD To the same degree as the SFM fosters holistic perspectives, the IAD has a
tendency to favor individualistic studies. This is due to the focus on the interaction
arena. But the character of the study depends in the end very much on the model that
is used within the interaction arena. If one models the interaction arena via a game
theoretic model and assumes the external variables to be exogeneous, one end up with a
individualistic study. If the interaction arena is modeled using a more sophisticated ABM
and the external variables and considered endogeneously, the resulting study is clearly
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systemic. The general tendency of the IAD is therefore in the individualist direction,
although it certainly allows for systemic accounts if the models for the interaction arena
are chosen accordingly. It is not compatible with either holistic epistemology or ontology.
4.3 The Relation among the different formalisms
SD models are predestined if there are some macro variables of interest that influence
each other according to rules that can adequately expressed via conventional differential
equations. As argued extensively by Radzicki (2009), SD models can usefully be used
to supplement analysis within a SFM. This combination has lead to spectacular results,
e.g. in Hayden and Bolduc (2000). Because SD is an approach focused on aggregate
variables and relationships, it is only of limited value within the IAD framework, as it
cannot be used intuitively to model the interaction arena which is mainly concerned with
the decisions on the micro level.
ABMs are to be preferred over SD models if either individuals can be expected to be
the driving forces of a system or if entities from different ontological levels are expected to
interact with each other and aggregation is thus not necessarily straightforward. ABMs
are also a good choice if one has more precise information or hypothesis about the
heuristics according to which individuals make their behavioral choices: Often, these
heuristics can be expressed much easier via algorithms than via conventional equations
and their role for determining the dynamics of the whole system can be explored.
Because they allow a very detailed representation real world systems and thus allow
the explicit consideration of various mechanisms and their interplay, ABMs are very well
suited to model the interaction arena within the IAD framework. They might also useful
to complement a SFM, especially if the SFM includes nodes from different ontological
levels and a system dynamics model is thus more difficult to implement.
Both SD and ABM can be used to conduct artificial experiments and thus to effectively
generate policy advice. Also, both models can be used to complement and qualify
econometric assessment of different hypotheses. Again, ABMs are to be preferred if one
wishes to assess the role of aggregation and (reconstitutive) downward effects within
the system. SD should be used if there are reasonable information about the relation
of macro variables, but a specification of mirco mechanisms would involve considerable
speculation. Especially if predictions for alternative policy measures are to be derived
this would be a strong argument in favor of SD. 13
Game theory is a prominent choice if it comes to model the interaction arena within
the IAD. Numerous examples have proven the effectiveness of this combination from
an orthodox viewpoint, although the resulting models can be considered only partial
successes if considered from the perspcective of socio-economics: As both the IAD and
GT have individualist tendencies, their combination will most likely fail to provide an
inpiring study of a societal system as a whole.
13Scholl (2001) argues for a certain complementarity among SD and ABM: They give insights to the
same system from different perspectives. This does not affects the argument that they not to be
used together.
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Also, if considered in combination with the SFM, GT can be very useful to illustrate a
relationship between two nodes in a qualitative manner, especially if the two nodes are
on the individual and/or the meso level. The embedding into the broader context of the
SFM-A effectively addresses the shortcommings of game theory and facilitates a systemic
interpretation of the model outcome and the rules of the game. Furthermore, within the
broader perspective of the SFM-A, practical policy recommendations can much easier be
derived than in the rather abstract GT models alone. If the game becomes to complicated
to be solved analytically, it can easily be implmented in an ABM framework: Especially
GT models involving a topological structure or many heterogeneous agents are solved
numerically within an ABM. This is particular attractive for socio-economic analysis as it
allows a further relaxation of the otherwise rigid assumptions in game theoretic models.
The last question is whether the SFM and IDA can be fruitfully used together. The
only cases in which this could be is if the SFM helps to identify important relationships
between the external variables with key variables in the interaction arena of the IAD, or
if one uses a very specific SFM within the IAD, either to clarify relevant dynamics within
the set of external variables or between external variables and the interaction arena.
Both cases are theoretically possible, but practically irrelevant. Even if the possibility
exists, there are probably much more intuitive ways to model the corresponding system
than to artificially bunch two frameworks together that come from, while not contrary,
but different perspectives.
5 Conclusion
This paper has presented different formalisms that can help socio economists in their
scrutinies. It is clear that neoclassical theory exaggerates the use of formalisms, but is by
no means representative for formalist analysis. All the formalisms discussed in this article
can potentially be useful for socio economic analysis, but to achieve this, the formalism
must be embedded into a broader theoretical frame: No formalism speaks adequately
for itself. All have to be interpreted, and their inherent ontological and epistemological
tendencies have to be reflected. This article therefore represents a potential starting point
for a more extensive and adequate use of formalisms in this sense. Much can be gained
from such an application: Formalist analysis can allow the consideration of questions
that had not yet been dealt with (e.g. the role of empirical network structure on societal
dynamics) and existing arguments can be made even more precise.
To conclude this paper, let us consider the question whether some of the formalisms
outlined here can help to bridge socio economic (of heterodox analysis more generally)
with more orthodox work. This might particularly the case for the IAD framework or
game theory, as these are also employed by neoclassical economists. Besides the question
about home much can be gained from such a dialogue, there should not be too much
hope put into the employability of the formalisms discussed in this article: The fact that
a certain framework, or a way of modelling is compatible with different theories still does
not exclude the possibility that the resulting studies are incommensurable: ABMs for
example are compatible with a wide range of different theories, including neoclassical
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theory.14 But different ABMs might not only lead very different results, they are very
different to compare. Their underlying ontologies might be entirely different, the one
model might be designed as part of an explanatory exposition, the other model as a
self-sufficient device for prediction. While both are models of the same type, they have
nothing else in common and can impossibly mutually advancing.
Giving the very limited weight neoclassical economics puts on socio economic questions,
thie inability of dialogue seems to be bearable. The more important messages of this
article are the exposition of cases where formalisms are essential for further progress in
socio economic analysis and the motivation of their reflected and adequate application in
the future.
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